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Abstract: We argue that work on norms provides a way to move beyond debates between 
proponents of individualist and structuralist approaches to bias, oppression, and injustice. We 
briefly map out the geography of that debate before presenting Charlotte Witt’s view, showing 
how her position, and the normative ascriptivism at its heart, seamlessly connects individuals to 
the social reality they inhabit. We then describe recent empirical work on the psychology of norms 
and locate the notions of informal institutions and soft structures with respect to it. Finally, we 
argue that the empirical resources enrich Witt’s ascriptivism, and that the resulting picture shows 
theorists need not, indeed should not, choose between either the individualist or structuralist 
camp. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
David Foster Wallace began his now famous Kenyon Commencement Address with the 
following “didactic little parable-ish” story: 
 
“There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish 
swimming the other way, who nods at them and says ‘Morning, boys. How’s the water?’ 
And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at 
the other and goes ‘What the hell is water?’” 
 
Continuing in that same didactic key, the point is that even life’s most important features can 
be so common as to disappear, remain transparent despite their significance, retain their 
power in part because they are so ubiquitous as to be taken for granted. 
 
The “water” we will try to bring into better view in this paper are the normative contours 
of the collective social reality that we all move through and the psychological apparatus that 
allows individuals to navigate it. A primary aim is to describe and demonstrate the relevance 
of an empirical framework and set of concepts for thinking about norms, one that will allow 
us to better see and understand the ways that norms are both individual and collective, and 
thus serve to join individuals and communities together. To that end, we will immediately 
replace the metaphor of water with that of connective tissue. Not only is it better suited to 
our purpose of rendering the typically transparent2 more visible, but we also welcome the 
connotations of a fabric that is pliable but tough, whose strength flows from but outstrips 
that of any of the individual fibers that make it up, and that serves the purpose of binding 
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different component parts into dynamic wholes. So too, we will argue, with norms, 
individual psychologies, and the soft but durable social structures that they help constitute. 
 
  Our plan of attack is to address a specific debate concerning the best way to approach 
racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice. The occasion for this debate (or this iteration of 
it) is the rise in prominence of work implicit bias and the philosophical attention it has 
received, particularly with respect to morality (see especially Brownstein and Saul 2016). 
Critics worry that this fixation on implicit cognition is unfortunate, if not outright 
counterproductive, because it draws attention away from the more significant structural 
sources of bias and from exploring institution-level mitigation strategies. 
 
We maintain that framing this as a debate, and the strategies as oppositional, is itself 
counterproductive. Rather, the choice between an individualist approach or a structuralist 
approach is not a choice anyone needs to make. Those whose primary focus is on 
institutions and structures will greatly benefit from engaging with the details emerging from 
the cognitive-scientific work on norms and norm psychology, and those interested in 
individual hearts and minds will greatly benefit from better appreciating collective level 
dynamics, especially the emerging and complementary empirical work on norm change, 
social learning, and cultural evolutionary theory. We briefly map out the geography of the 
debate in Section II, describing some of the positions taken and the reasoning behind them. 
In Section III, we use Charlotte Witt’s views on gender to help situate our own, showing 
how her position, and the normative ascriptivism at its heart, provides an initial way to 
conceptualize how individuals are integrated into the social reality they inhabit. In Section IV 
we describe recent empirical work suggesting that human minds are equipped with a 
psychological system dedicated to norm cognition and motivation. Finally, in Section V, we 
pull the discussions together, laying the ways our position coincides with and departs from 
Witt’s. We flesh out the notions of informal institutions and soft structures and argue that 
the picture of norm psychology emerging from the human sciences supports a qualified 
version of Witt’s normative ascriptivism. Finally, we revisit the individualist/structuralist 
debate and point to ways that resources drawn from each approach can be put together into 
a more integrated, and potentially more fruitful, approach. 
 
II. A Brief Sketch of Conceptual Geography: Individualist and Structuralist 
Approaches to Bias 
 
Those who wish to understand and change the social world face big questions about 
how to proceed and how to best direct their efforts. This is exacerbated by the complexity of 
many social problems. Neither causes nor solutions are straightforward, and it is difficult to 
know who or what to hold accountable. Simplifying idealizations help, and theorists taking 
up these challenges can be divided into roughly two camps, individualists and structuralists, 
according to which initial idealization they favor. Broadly speaking, individualists take 
primary causes of and solutions to many social injustices to be found at the level of the 
individual, perhaps within the hearts and minds of those individuals. Structuralists, on the 
other hand, take the causes of and solutions to social ills like persistent bias, discrimination, 
and other forms of injustice to lie in the institutions that structure society, i.e. in practices, 
traditions, social arrangements, laws, and even in the physical distribution of land and goods. 
While most theorists acknowledge the importance of factors of both types, most often 
proceed as if one type has primacy over the other. 
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Over the past several years, philosophical disagreements between individualists and 
structuralists have re-emerged as research on implicit bias has moved to center stage. 
Structuralists have worried that concern for implicit bias is far too individual-centric; ridding 
every person of implicit biases would still fail to e.g. help those living in poverty who lose a 
job because structural changes to bus routes prevent them from being able to commute. 
Large scale injustices can occur without any individual intending or personally causing them. 
Hence, structuralists maintain that being overly focused on individuals can obscure the most 
significant drivers of social dynamics and so will yield meager resources for affecting deep 
and abiding social change.3 
 
Perhaps the most prominent advocate of structuralism within philosophy is Elizabeth 
Anderson, who argues desegregation is a moral imperative. According to her view, the root 
and fundamental cause of racial inequities can be linked to de facto segregation. Anderson 
acknowledges other factors, for instance limited public transportation or norms around 
hiring and job advertisement but sees these causes as structural as well.4 Similarly, Haslanger 
argues that the most concerning cases of injustice can be explained solely in terms of 
structural factors and so without appeal to the mental states of individuals. She imagines 
three cases focused on, respectively, structures of social life, schemas under which we 
operate, and policies allocating resources to people in ways that are unequal or inequitable. 
In her examples, no individual person does anything wrong; rather, the structural factors 
cause and maintain injustice. Given this premise, it is unsurprising that many structuralists 
see their approach as superior. They also tacitly assume that if current structures were 
replaced with more just and unbiased ones, individual changes would result as a ‘free’ 
byproduct. Many structuralists nominally acknowledge the necessity of changes to individual 
hearts and mind, but their theories suggest that, alone, such individual changes will not 
suffice to bring about robust social change.5 
 
Alternatively, many of the most influential proponents of an individualist approach are 
focused on racism and acknowledge that while there are structures that contribute to 
inequitable outcomes, this is not where the wrongs of racism lie. Rather, those wrongs 
ultimately flow from the attitudes and other mental states of individuals, meaning attention 
should be paid primarily to those. For example, Garcia holds that racism is affective, in a 
person’s heart; it is a type of moral disregard that individuals have for others qua race.6 Blum 
offers a variation on this individualist theme, arguing that racism is more cognitive, in a 
person’s head. At bottom it is thinking about and treating other individuals as inferior, or 
harboring dislike and hostility for others because of their race. Subtle distinctions help 
support such claims. Blum notes that while there are many manifestations of badness and 
injustice about which individuals should be concerned, not all should count as racist. Racial 
ills can occur even in the absences of people and beliefs that are genuinely racist.7 Both 
philosophers are often characterized as individualists, because both pursue this general 
strategy for characterizing racism and embrace its implication that individuals and their 
mental states ought to be the primary focal point in fighting it.8 
 
Since the recent attention given to implicit biases seems to fall squarely in this camp, it is 
no surprise that structuralist critics have criticized it. They have argued that many types of 
injustice would still occur even if most people implicit biases were eradicated,9 and urged 
 4 
that the (alleged) individualist focus of philosophical discussions of implicit bias draws 
attention away from the root causes of social injustices.10 
 
The prospects for moving beyond these familiar disputes appears promising, though. 
Madva offers compelling arguments that the push to give priority to structural approaches is, 
even when coherent, misguided.11 He points out that since bringing about structural change 
often requires that individuals choose to work for it, insisting on a clean separation of the two 
is misleading. Saul challenges the usefulness of the distinction on similar grounds, supporting 
her case by pointing out that as an instructor she can make the individual choice to change 
her grading policy, which would install a structural change that systematically affects all of 
her students.12 Another theme running through these discussions is that there are continuous 
feedback loops of mutual influence between individuals and structures, minds and social 
worlds.13 
 
We see these recent developments as heading in the right direction. So rather than shift 
away from a focus on empirical psychological research, we will double-down on it. In the 
next sections, we will explore the crucial role that norms play in connecting individuals and 
structures, and show how empirical work on norm psychology can deepen the understanding 
of those connections. 
 
III. Witt On Social Reality 
 
We now turn up the resolution of our discussion on a specific position. The main project 
of Charlotte Witt’s The Metaphysics of Gender is to develop an Aristotelian account of gender 
essentialism14 – which she calls ‘uniessentialism’, and which we will unpack below. While 
pursuing that project, she also occasionally comments on how the conceptual apparatus of 
her view can help reconceive the aims of feminism, and thus inform efforts to address 
oppression, bias, and injustice. She sets out her position here in contrast to a familiar type of 
individual-centric alternative: 
 
Gender uniessentialism directs our attention away from individual psychologies, 
their conscious and unconscious biases, and “deformed” processes of choice, and 
toward the social world, its available social roles … I do not mean to dismiss or to 
criticize important feminist work on deformed preferences or to minimize the role of 
gender schemas or implicit bias in perpetuating discrimination against women. But 
gender uniessentialism points in another direction, away from a focus on individual 
psychologies and toward the social world and its normative structure, which defines 
the conditions of agency for women (our bold).15 
 
Here we see three of the four main components of our reconstruction of Witt’s view. 
The first is her endorsement of structuralism as the best way to understand and address 
oppression, which we see in her call for more attention to be paid to social structures and 
her urge that priority be given to changing social roles and the larger structures in which they 
are found. This goes hand in hand with the second component, which we will call her 
relegation of psychology, seen in her drawing focus away from individuals and their 
internal psychological processes and choices, and redirecting it rather to the cultural ecology 
in which individuals find themselves and to the external social structures that shape the 
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options they can choose between. Witt’s emphasis is on feminism and gender, but we believe 
her strategy here can be effectively generalized to other social groups and injustices. 
 
The third component, her uniessentialism about gender, is more complicated. The 
crucial, and perhaps primary, elements of social reality on Witt’s account are social roles and 
norms. Though she adds nuance to each within her system, the basic ideas are familiar. 
Social roles are the parts an individual plays in different group contexts, the positions she 
occupies in various communities and institutional arrangements. Each social role is situated 
within a network of expectations and guidelines that attach to and shape those parts and 
positions. To occupy a social role is to be a member of a socially recognized and widely 
known (within the group) category and thus to be thought of and treated as an instance of 
that category by members of the community – including, often but not always, in a reflexive 
way by the occupier of the social role herself. In virtue of this, an individual who occupies a 
type of social role (e.g. barista, father, director of undergraduate studies) will end up being 
subject to many of the same sorts of norms and expectations as other individuals who 
occupy that type of social role.16 
 
While we will have more to say about norms below, as a working definition we can 
construe them as the rules, often unwritten, that organize social life, marking out what 
behaviors are required, appropriate, permitted, or forbidden for different kinds of people in 
different circumstances. Witt also provides some artful terminology to draw attention to the 
kind of influence that norms have on those to whom they apply. Individuals experience the 
normative pull of norms associated with the specific social roles that they occupy, and they 
experience that pull because they are responsive to and evaluable under those norms. By 
“responsive to” Witt means that “the individual’s behavior is calibrated in relation to the 
norm,”17 and by “evaluable under” she means that “the individual is a candidate for 
evaluation by others in relation to that norm.”18 Little detail is provided concerning how the 
calibrating is done or how interpersonal evaluation is converted into behavioral influence, 
but complaining about this would miss the point. By our lights, the value, especially of the 
later pair of expressions, is that they explicitly mark that normative influence over an 
individual’s behavior can originate from within the individual as well as from without, from 
internal responsiveness and motivation as much as from external social pressure applied in 
the wake of evaluations made by others in her community.  
 
The pieces are now in place to better grasp Witt’s doctrine about the metaphysics of 
gender, her uniessentialism. On this view, gender is a special kind of “mega” social role. 
Whether one is recognized as a man or woman, for instance, provides an individual with a 
principle of normative unity, which serves to order and organize all of the other social roles 
the individual occupies. Gender mega-social roles also thereby prioritize all of the norms an 
individual is responsive to and evaluable under, helping to determine which will take 
precedence in scenarios where multiple and conflicting norms might apply.19 
 
The need for the principle of unity provided by gender arises, according to Witt, because 
every individual occupies many social roles of many different types, both at a single time and 
also over the course of her lifetime. For instance, a single individual might be a daughter, a 
sister, an ex-ballet dancer, a newly converted Buddhist, a founder of the Younger Womxn’s 
Task Force of Greater Lafayette, a radiologist, and a dues-paying member of the AMA. 
Some of these social roles require that one choose to enter and identify with the role in order 
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to be socially recognized as being an instance of the type. Becoming a radiologist requires an 
explicit and long-term commitment to gaining the relevant license and expertise, and 
occupation of the position comes with both prestige and rights as well as expectations and 
obligations, both official and un-. Many other social roles, however, require neither choice 
nor conscious identification for individuals who occupy them to be subject to their 
normative pull. For these less voluntary, often more covert social roles, an individual is 
recognized by others as occupying the role whether or not she realizes it, and whether she 
would like to be in that role or not. In being so recognized, she is also brought under the 
pull of the norms associated with the role.20 
 
This point leads to the fourth, and for our purposes most interesting, component of 
Witt’s view, her ascriptivism. We interpret this as a position about what makes an individual 
subject to the normative pull of a norm. She throws the idea into relief by contrasting it with 
voluntarism, the position associated with Kantians like Korsgaard that, roughly, the authority 
that a norm holds over an individual rests in the individual’s voluntary acceptance of the 
norm and her conscious, deliberate commitment to or endorsement of it.21 Ascriptivists like 
Witt, on the other hand, hold that voluntarism cannot account for the full range of norms 
and social roles. Rather, in many important cases individuals become responsive to and 
evaluable under norms because those norms are ascribed to them by other members of their 
community, even if the collective ascription is made without the individuals’ knowledge or 
consent. As Witt points out, individuals do not voluntarily choose what culture they are born 
into, nor do they choose many of the social roles they come to occupy within it. For those 
roles, they also do not choose the associated norms whose normative pull they will 
experience, nor, even, many of the norms they will internalize and apply to themselves. 
Hence, voluntary acceptance or endorsement need not have much to do with many of the 
norms individuals will be socially pressured to comply with or feel internally motivated to 
obey. As she puts it: “The social role is normative for an individual if she occupies a given 
social position whether or not that individual consciously identifies with or chooses that 
social position … Rebellion is one way of being responsive to a norm; so is compliance.”22 
 
One of the many virtues of ascriptivism is that it makes room for the sorts of conflict 
that can lead to full blown ‘rebellion’, where an individual is at odds with a norm that others 
evaluate her by, and chafes under what she experiences as the oppressive social pressure to 
comply. Indeed, as we will suggest below, ascriptivism, supported with empirical resources, 
can yield a psychologically plausible story of the internal dimension of such conflicts as well. 
Ultimately, we are pluralists; voluntarism can capture how some norms shape a person’s 
behavior, but ascriptivism is much better-suited for others. For example, it begins to 
illuminate how an individual can consciously reject an ascribed norm while nevertheless 
remaining responsive to it, how she can explicitly and honestly disavow, rebel against, a 
norm while continuing to feel the force of its normative pull.23 
 
IV. Social Norms and the Psychology of Normativity: A View from the Human 
Behavioral Sciences 
 
Our discussion in this section draws on research from an array of different disciplines 
and theorists, and so is of necessity compressed.24 We highlight features of norm psychology 
that look to be common ground among many of them, but the compiled view is our own, 
and our presentation of it is tailored to fit the argumentative needs of this paper. Foremost 
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among those are showing how this view fits with Witt’s project, and pointing to ways the 
resulting picture can broaden our understanding of the psychological microfoundations 
underlying norms and institutions, the character of the interface between individual minds 
and soft social structures, and the sources of stability and change in these connective tissues. 
 
The core idea is that individual human minds feature what we will call a norm system: a 
set of fairly functionally integrated psychological mechanisms dedicated to handling 
information and guiding behavior specifically concerned with norms and the situations they 
govern. To a first approximation, this system exhibits many of the properties associated with 
modular,25 or system 1 cognition.26 It is a semi-autonomous subsystem of the mind as a 
whole, whose operation is typically fast, automatic and effortless, and thus often implicit; it 
can and often does perform its functions outside of awareness and without conscious 
guidance. From the first-person perspective, the deliverances of this sub-personal system are 
often intuitive, not seeming to arrive at consciousness as the products of explicit 
deliberation. Those deliverances can thus be perplexing, experienced as powerfully 
motivating and perhaps authoritative, yet phenomenologically different from mere urges or 
personal preferences. They have been described as containing a “puzzling combination of 
objective and subjective elements.”27 
 
What does this subsystem of the human mind do, then? One cluster of functions 
performed by the norm system centers on identifying and internalizing the norms that 
prevail in the individual’s local community and culture. This acquisition mechanism draws 
the individual’s attention to salient social interactions happening around her and makes 
inferences about the rules governing those interactions. This process of social learning is 
itself largely automatic, as the acquisition mechanism, guided by various constraints and 
heuristics, allows an individual to intuitively key in on and absorb the normative structure on 
display in her social environment. The activity of this domain specific learning machinery 
can be supplemented by verbal instruction provided by elders, teachers, and peers, filling in 
details about the scope of a rule and the specifics of the behavior it prescribes or proscribes, 
the parameters of the situations it governs, the types of persons to which it applies, and the 
form and strength of sanctions appropriate to violations thereof. Norms thus acquired are 
internalized by the individual. After episodes of this form of enculturation, the rule 
extracted from her social environment is mentally represented in the individual’s norm 
system, along with the relevant information about its parameters. 
 
The other cluster of functions performed by the norm system is aimed at performance 
and drives the ways an individual acts on those norms she has internalized. This execution 
mechanism is responsible for identifying situations and types of people to which a norm 
internalized by the individual might apply. It is also responsible for motivating the individual 
to act in the way specified by the norm, given the particulars of the current situation and the 
people involved in it. If the rule applies to the individual herself, the execution system will 
supply motivation for her to obey it, and so behave in a way that conforms to the norm. If 
the rule is being violated by someone, the execution system will supply motivation for the 
individual to enforce it, and so behave in ways that sanction the violator and communicate 
the wrongness of the transgression. 
 
A key claim of this account is that these normative motivations produced by the norm 
system are special: they are intrinsic, non-instrumental, perhaps psychologically primitive. 
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The injunctions encoded in a norm that has been internalized will influence behavior in ways 
indicating they are ends in themselves, rather than steps towards something beyond and 
more primary. People often follow norms not as a means to gain material reward or avoid 
external punishment, but just because it seems or feels, from a first-person perspective, like 
the proverbial right thing to do. In these ways, the normative motivations generated by the 
norm system appear to differ from other motivational states like personal preferences or 
instrumental desires.28 
 
Not only are internalized norms intrinsically motivating, but the motivation is also “two-
pronged,” both self- and other-directed. On the one hand, it induces the individual to keep 
her own behavior in conformity with the norm, and, on the other, it induces punitive 
behaviors (and sometimes generates accompanying reactive attitudes) towards those who fail 
to do the same. As is the case with other behaviors subserved by system 1 type processes, 
the norm system can automatically monitor the social environment for signs of what norms 
apply to the current situation, and, when one is detected, immediately generate the normative 
motivations that are appropriate to it via a fast, relatively direct link between cue and 
response. At a collective level, once a rule is represented in the norm systems of sufficiently 
many members of a community – members who, having internalized the norm, become 
intrinsically motivated to comply with it themselves and sanction those who don’t – the 
result is a group-level behavioral regularity that is self-stabilizing. The norm is kept in place 
by each individual members’ reliable propensity to comply and punish those who step out of 
line. 
 
Taking a step back, the basic gist of this way of thinking about individual minds and their 
component parts will be recognizable to most philosophers, who are by now be familiar with 
automatic and implicit cognition, as well as the notion of modularity, the general structure of 
dual process theories, and the controversies surrounding each.29 We need not take a stand 
here on how much of the entire mind is modular or how sharp, in general, the divide 
between system 1 and system 2 processes is. But it will be useful to note a few ways in which 
the norm system in particular appears to fit and run afoul of the general template. The norm 
system, and the core features we have drawn attention to, bears many of the marks of being 
an innate and universal part of human psychological nature.30 Punishment-stabilized 
behavioral regularities are ubiquitous in human cultures, where all manner of activities and 
social arrangements are structured by norms delimiting what is required, appropriate, 
permitted, and forbidden.31 Evidence also suggests that behaviors associated with the norm 
system emerge in development along a fairly regular ontogenetic trajectory, which itself 
appears consistent across cultures.32 
 
Despite the uniform elements in its core structure and operating principles, the norm 
system is able to support considerable cross-cultural variation in social structures as well. 
While norms in general are universal, their specific content is not. Human societies exhibit 
eye-opening diversity in their social arrangements and the particular behavior-guiding rules 
that govern them. Children tend to acquire those norms prevalent in the culture in which 
they grow up, and adolescents and adults eventually acquire the specific norms of the roles 
and positions they come to occupy within their community. These, of course, can vary 
dramatically from culture to culture, even from community to community and from role to 
role within a community (as is emphasized by, for instance, theorists of race and gender). 
These points suggest that as with language acquisition, a person’s norm system intuitively 
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identifies and internalizes those norms it finds in whatever social environment she confronts, 
picking up on cues from peers, mentors, and others.33 The resulting picture indicates that 
however much of the norm system is innately structured, it clearly requires and ‘expects’ 
substantial input from experience and social learning to become calibrated enough to 
successfully perform its functions. Moreover, there is good reason to think this is a domain 
specific species of social learning whose underlying mechanisms automatically imbue those 
norms they infer with distinctively two-pronged normative motivations. 
 
Taken together, this picture shows how people become interconnected into cohesive 
communities, and how adopting the relevant norms allows individuals to get and remain in 
sync with the groups of which they are members. On the one hand, present in the 
community that an individual seeks to enter are a number of group level patterns that make 
up some of the structures of that community’s social world. Most salient will be broad 
patterns of punishment-stabilized behavioral regularities. Also salient will be pieces of 
information that illuminate group boundaries and that indicate how to properly identify and 
interact with occupants of different kinds of social roles. On the other hand, present in an 
individual’s mind is the universal and relatively automated psychological system that remains 
alert for the pieces of information that are crucial but distributed across the social 
environment. This cognitive machinery underpins norm acquisition and performance, and 
infuses internalized rules with its distinctive kind of two-pronged motivational influence. It 
thus serves to reliably bring the behavior of the individual into line with whatever norms are 
acquired, harmonizing their behavior and sensibilities with the social structures that organize 
the group. The latter (individual level psychological machinery) extracts guidelines via 
exposure to the former (group level patterns and social structures), allowing the individual to 
naturally and smoothly enter into the interactions typical of his or her community, and thus 
contribute to its social dynamics. In this way, social norms form a soft but durable 
connective tissue that binds individuals to groups via cycling loops of mutual influence. 
  
V. Minding the Gap: Soft Structures, Informal Institutions, and Other Dichotomy 
Busters 
  
Recall the four central components of Witt’s view we identified above:  
 
1) Uniessentialism about gender 
• Gender provides a social individual with her principle of normative unity 
• This principle takes the form of a mega-social role that orders and organizes 
all her other social roles and thus all of the norms that apply to her 
2) Structuralism about understanding and addressing bias, oppression, and injustice 
• More attention needs to be paid to social structures, and more effort directed 
to changing the normative contours of social reality 
• Social elements like roles, norms, and other structural level entities deserve 
explanatory and normative priority 
3) Ascriptivism about normativity 
• Many social roles, and thus norms, are simply ascribed to an individual, 
making the individual responsive to and evaluable under those norms even in 
the absence of any decision or consent from the individual him or her self 
• Rejection of pure voluntarist views norms 
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4) Relegation of psychology 
• Too much focus on individuals and the components of individual 
psychologies is not just misguided but counterproductive 
• Rejection of the idea that social progress can or will be achieved through 
transformation at the level of individual choice alone 
 
Uniessentialism 
 
We remain neutral on the first component. As mentioned above, uniessentialism about 
gender is the main thesis of Witt’s project, and she marshals these other components in the 
service of its articulation and defense. Our interests and aims, at least for this paper, lie 
elsewhere, and so here we take no stand on the uniessentialist thesis, or any other position 
regarding the metaphysics of gender (though see endnote 23). 
 
Structuralism 
 
Our position regarding the second component is more complicated. On the one hand, 
we agree with the core idea that more attention to social structures and a richer set of 
conceptual tools with which to analyze them is required to better understand and fight 
oppression. On the other, we would reject an extreme or exclusionary version of this 
structuralist call to arms. We are skeptical of the suggestion that structural accounts can do 
all of the required explanatory work or that they deserve some kind of explanatory priority. 
Rather, we advocate a more ecumenical version, one that holds that whatever else is in the 
mix, appeal to social structures will be indispensable to understanding the sources of 
injustice and to reducing bias. We further maintain that the empirical framework described in 
Section IV contains the kinds of conceptual tools that will be indispensable in continuing to 
bridge the perceived gap between structuralist and individualist approaches. 
 
For instance, it can suggest ways to both broaden and sharpen our understanding of 
what counts as a structure in the first place. One uncontroversial form of structural change is 
change in official laws and other explicit rules that make up what we will call formal 
institutions. Following other theorists in the tradition we are advocating, we understand 
institutions in general as “the laws, informal rules, and conventions that give durable 
structure to social interactions in a population”.34 Institutions are structures; they are not 
ephemeral things, but rather give rise to and support stable collective patterns as opposed to 
singular or one-off social events. Formal institutions are the kinds of political, legal, 
financial, and other social organizations that are structured by explicitly formulated, often 
written down and publicly accessible laws, regulations, policies, or decrees. Conditions required 
for membership in such institutions, and for occupying particular offices and positions 
within them, are likewise fairly unambiguously stated by the relevant set of governing rules. 
These also often explicitly specify the scope of the powers and duties attendant to any office, 
as well as the form and severity of the punishment that will result from the violation of any 
rules. In formal institutions, these rules are typically not merely shared, but “on the books”: 
gathered together, written down, and codified in constitutions, legal documents, sets of by-
laws, and other explicit, official policies. 
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Informal institutions share some of these characteristics. They too are structures, giving 
rise to and supporting stable collective patterns rather than unique episodes. Informal 
institutions also have positions and behavior-guiding rules as core components. However, 
they differ in important ways as well. Their constituent positions are not offices or jobs to 
which members are officially appointed, but rather more casual, sometimes covert social 
roles. As such, the requirements of membership and role occupancy in communities and 
groups bound together by informal institutions are frequently less explicit or obvious. 
Moreover, their proprietary rules are not explicit policies and ratified laws, but norms: the 
generally known but sometimes tacit guidelines, unwritten rules, shared but unofficial 
standards, implicit arrangements, verbally communicated customs and traditions that 
organize the social interactions of the community. Penalties for transgressions of these rules 
are imposed by the community, but they are neither fully standardized nor delivered via any 
proceduralized apparatus of punishment. Rather enforcement typically takes the form of 
expressions of disapproval, reputation damaging gossip, ostracism, and other kinds of 
informal social sanctioning. As Helmke and Levitsky characterize them, informal institutions 
are “socially shared rules . . . that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels.”35 
 
Informal institutions are what we think of as soft structures. They are obviously not as 
literally hard as physical or geographical structures. Nor are they as easily visible or 
particulate as legal structures and formal policies. Still, we maintain that informal institutions, 
social roles, and norms deserve to be thought of as structure, albeit of a softer and unrulier 
sort than these contrast classes. As with many features of her physical environment, informal 
institutions are also actual, sturdy parts of the world external to an individual’s skin and skull. 
They are real and important environmental regularities, patterns of collective behavior that 
exist (in part) beyond an individual’s own head, and to which she needs to be keenly attuned. 
These structures are also soft, and more fluidly interwoven with the soft selves of the 
individuals who they help organize and bind together. The norms an individual has 
internalized are embodied in her own person, existing (in part) as psychological states 
physically realized in her brain and body, and manifest in her own actions.36 
 
Another similarity between soft structures and their harder counterparts is that in many 
cases neither are chosen by the people who inhabit them. Just as an individual does not 
decide what geographical location and climate she initially inhabits, or what nation’s 
citizenship she is born into, individuals do not get to hand-pick all of the informal 
institutions to which they become bound, either. Nevertheless, a person comes to occupy 
many roles, and so becomes responsive to and evaluable under their attendant norms, 
whether or not she approves of these structural aspects of her external reality or is happy 
with her place in them. Informal institutions, social roles, and norms are thus recalcitrant in 
the way other structures are; most are independent of any one person’s preferences and are 
not immediately responsive to individual decisions and judgments about them. Perhaps most 
saliently, when she is presented with genuine opportunities to choose, the soft structures that 
an individual inhabits will affect the range of options and outcomes she has to select from. 
Thus, they very much shape and constrain her behavior in exactly the ways that advocates of 
structuralist approaches emphasize. 
  
Of course, soft and hard structures often exist alongside one another, and understanding 
the complicated relationship between the two is one of the issues we will call more attention 
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to presently. One final, crucial (dis)analogy is worth noting first, though. A distinctive feature 
of formal institutions is that, unlike their informal counterparts, they typically include what 
Hart called secondary rules: roughly, rules about how to change the rules.37 Along with 
first order rules about e.g. what actions are legal or not, or what powers and duties come 
with a particular office, formal institutions also have on their books official rules that 
explicitly specify the procedures by which the official rules can be altered. These will say 
precisely what needs to happen, for instance, for an existing law to be repealed or struck 
down, for a new by-law to be adopted, for an amendment to be added to a constitution, or 
for addenda to officially supplement an established policy clarifying how it is to be applied to 
situations that were previously grey areas. Informal institutions and soft structures 
conspicuously lack any analogous rules or procedures for changes minor and peripheral or 
major and globally transformative. Soft structures do, of course, change. But they do not 
come with an instruction manual that lays out clearly articulated protocols for adding a new 
norm or removing or altering an extant one. Informal institutions and soft structures do not 
have any of what we think of a formal apparatus of change. This crucial difference raises 
challenges concerning how to appropriately frame questions about how and why soft 
structures and informal institutions change and how to most effectively bring about and 
guide specific, targeted changes. Doing so will most likely require moving beyond simple 
analogies with formal institutions and a significantly enriched set of conceptual tools. 
 
Because change is still needed. Soft structures, like their harder and more explicit 
counterparts, can be more or less fair, and norms themselves can be comparatively unjust or 
oppressive to the individuals who occupy different social roles. As Witt and other 
structuralists stress, many of the contributors to prejudice lie in features of the world 
external to an oppressed individual’s mind. The enemy is certainly at the gates, but still 
largely outside of them. With respect to the individual, these features of informal institutions 
are supra-personal and relatively rigid. They are not directly under the control or behest of 
personal level psychological actions like choice, decision, or avowal. But when it comes to 
unjust and oppressive norms, the enemy is very often inside the gates as well. People can 
adopt all kinds of norms, and when they soak up the soft structure of their communities, 
individuals can internalize norms that are unfairly restrictive to occupiers of the very social 
roles that they occupy. People can thus, in a way we now think of as Foucauldian, come to 
participate in their own oppression. They can become intrinsically motivated to contribute to 
systems of social influence that maintain their own subjection and restrict their own options 
and opportunities, often with the help of comforting stories they strain to tell themselves 
about why the situation is acceptable.38 In a dispiritingly real sense, they will thereby become 
biased against themselves. 
 
Ascriptivism 
  
This brings us to the third component of Witt’s view, her ascriptivism, which we 
endorse.39 We interpret this position as descriptive, one that primarily concerns the 
conditions in which an individual comes under the ‘normative umbrella’ of a norm, and the 
sources of the normative pull she thereby comes to experience. Supplementing ascriptivism 
with our account of the norm system provides details about how being subject to normative 
pull often translates into influence over behavior. As we remarked above, a particularly 
attractive feature of ascriptivism is that it calls attention to how normative influence over an 
individual’s behavior can come from within as well as from without. The addition of this 
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psychological perspective, with its appeal to intrinsic motivation, along with the other 
automatized properties of the norm system, sheds additional light on how both internal and 
external sources of influence can be brought to bear in the absence of anyone’s conscious 
choice, and can be effective without anyone’s avowal or consent. 
 
Once an individual comes to be recognized as occupying a certain social role, she will 
have the associated norms ascribed to her, by others and often herself. So, on the 
assumption that a norm is widely internalized by members of the community, and an 
individual is widely recognized as being an occupant of the social role that the norm applies 
to, the individual will be evaluated by reference to the norm and punished by others when 
she deviates from it. In cases where the norm has also been internalized by that same 
individual, she will evaluate herself, her own behavior by reference to it, even if tacitly or 
subconsciously. The empirical psychological story thus implies that a person’s behavior can 
be internally responsive to, and indeed she can even evaluate herself according to, norms 
she has not explicitly accepted, voluntarily committed to, or even consciously acknowledged. 
Her psychological norm system can generate these effects on its own. Indeed, given the 
automatic and often implicit nature of the psychological machinery involved, together with 
the motivational power it imbues to internalized norms, such norms may become part of a 
person’s sense of herself, fueling pre-verbal feelings about who she “really” is, which can be 
powerful even when somewhat inchoate.40 
 
Thus, Witt’s ascriptivism, supplemented with the empirical picture, helps make clear how 
norms live a kind of double life. In order to actually act as an effective connective tissue, 
norms transcend a number of traditional and perhaps intuitive dichotomies. They have both 
individual and group level properties; they generate both endogenous sub-personal and 
exogenous supra-personal sources of influence on individual people; they induce behavior 
both internally, in the form of normative motivations to act, and externally in the form of 
reliable, socially delivered punishment and reward; they have stabilizing effects on both self 
and others. 
 
The relegation of psychology 
 
The cost of accepting this expanded and empirically strengthened case for the third 
component of Witt’s view is rejection of her fourth component, the relegation of 
psychology. This, we maintain, is a price clearly worth paying. Appreciating how individual 
minds process norms will be just as indispensable to understanding the sources of injustice 
and to reducing bias as appreciating structural factors. Indeed, the two should continue to be 
integrated. Structuralists’ efforts should be united with accounts of normative cognition and 
motivation, and of the psychological mechanisms that guide how norms are learned and how 
they spread through populations. 
 
This view of the double life of norms can provide new ways to conceptualize bias and 
oppressive social structures, pointing to new pathways for more effectively and deliberately 
changing them. As noted, informal institutions lack a formal apparatus of change, but 
change nevertheless. The empirical picture suggests that many important factors influencing 
these decentralized group level dynamics – the cultural evolution of social reality – are 
properties of individual’s norm systems. Luckily there is a burgeoning field that investigates 
cultural evolution and how it is supported and shaped by different components of human 
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minds.41 It suggests that key factors will be prestige biases, which nudge cultural learners to 
adopt norms demonstrated by those held in high regard and seen to have the greatest 
success and status, and conformity biases, which make people more likely to adopt the 
norm most common among their (actual and aspirational) peers.42 
 
Norms and soft structures have tremendous influence on the minds and behaviors of 
individuals, independently of (and in some ways more directly than) the formal policies or 
material incentives they live alongside. But norms interact with and influence those formal 
institutions as well. Another pay off of this work is that it directs us to ask new questions 
about the way soft structures and formal institutions interact with each other. Many are 
familiar with examples of failed attempts to force “top down” changes by imposing new 
formal institutions without considering if and how they will mesh with a community’s extant 
norms and soft structures. For example, at times the US has made forms of aid to areas of 
Afghanistan conditional on a fixed percentage of leadership roles in newly installed formal 
institutions (town council-like entities) being filled by women. The condition failed at 
achieving the intended outcome of initiating local change towards attitudes of gender equity, 
or pushing entrenched soft structures away from the sexist status quo. Instead, when a 
community complied with this condition, which was inconsistent with gender norms that 
were deeply internalized by most Afghans, it appeared to have the effect of rendering the 
newly formed formal institutions illegitimate in the eyes of much of the population. This 
interplay seemed to render the appointees less effective, and the imposed formal institutions 
more likely to be rejected than to take root and stabilize on their own.43 
  
Another possible outcome is acquiescence. In these cases, formal laws are brought to 
bear on a community or domain of activity that is already organized by a set of norms, and 
the laws differ from those norms already internalized by the members of the community. 
Here, when the norms prove too entrenched and the mismatch is judged to be unworkable, 
the formal institution finally gives up and simply acquiesces, adopting instead the soft 
structure and enshrining the norms into formal law.44 
 
Other attempts are simply ineffective. In the case of Batson vs. Kentucky, the US 
Supreme Court ruled that rejecting potential jurors based only on their race was 
unconstitutional. There is good reason to believe, however, that the explicit law did nothing 
to stop the actual practice. It changed neither minds nor norms. Rather, lawyers switched to 
giving different explicit rationales for rejecting potential jurors, but their decisions remained 
as racially driven as they were before the ruling. In this case the underlying soft structures 
and norms concerning race remain resilient even in the face of explicit formal legislation 
designed to uproot them.45 
 
These examples help to begin illustrating how this integrationist, norm-based framework 
can shape future research. It can inform not only top down strategies like those just 
discussed, but also more bottom up strategies of the sort associated with activists and 
grassroots movements. For instance, we can distinguish between trying to formulate and 
promulgate genuinely new norms, on the one hand, and attempts to normatively reframe 
an activity, prying off a norm that was previously governing it, and replacing it with a 
different, better one. This idea is particularly useful in illustrating how the norms and soft 
structures of a community influence and interact with formal institutions via the official 
policy makers who control its formal apparatus of change. In a democracy, norms widely 
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shared by members of a constituency will influence what policy options are seen as feasible, 
viable ideas likely to be accepted as laws. Additionally, political actors who occupy formal 
positions in government institutions will have internalized role-specific norms, some of 
which will influence how they evaluate policy ideas, which will in turn influence their 
willingness to act as advocates or opponents for different bills. Climate change activists have 
recently achieved surprising levels of success using the strategy of normative reframing to 
advance their agenda.46 
 
A more complete account of social change will have to continue wrestling with problems 
of scale as well. Evolutionary theories of culture can provide guidance, as much recent work 
has explored the different kinds of norms and social dynamics required to support 
cooperation and collective action in larger societies, rather than just small communities.47 
This work dovetails with an issue that activists often struggle with, that of how to 
successfully export norms that are prominent and central to their smaller, local subcultures. 
Such norms are often consciously devised in the face of discussion and refined by rational 
argumentation by members of those small communities, who are often deeply invested, 
building their social identity around the issues and values associated with those norms (BLM, 
women’s rights, animal rights, eating habits and food ethics, etc.) These subcultures and 
smaller communities are of course not completely isolated, but overlap with other 
subcultures, and are nested within larger groups, including ultimately the overarching society. 
One possible method for effectively fashioning and promulgating norms is suggested by 
work on cultural evolution. In brief, competition between these smaller groups could spark 
micro and mezzo episodes of cultural group selection that would generate norms likely to 
both work and spread, which in this case means being passed on and adopted by more and 
larger groups.48 
 
Or perhaps a different set of tools than those that work to get a norm accepted in a 
small group will be needed to export it to other groups, let alone to go viral, hit the 
mainstream, becoming common not just in a particular subculture but in the larger 
embedding society as well. Activists for many causes seem to intuitively understand the 
effectiveness of prestige heuristics in spreading their norms and values, judging by their 
efforts to seek out celebrity spokespersons as bearers of their message, especially 
spokespersons whose proverbial “crossover appeal” allows them to connect with a wider 
audience. This idea is ripe for development, especially with enriched understanding of norm 
psychology and how it interacts with extant institutions. The mechanisms and heuristics that 
guide social learning and norm transmission will be of particular interest, as they may be 
leveraged by those attempting launch a particular norm from its initial home in a smaller 
community to the entire society, to the Big Time. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Soft structures are a crucial part of a person’s environment. She must locate herself 
therein and learn how to navigate through and wrestle with and reconcile herself to various 
facets of those soft structures, many of which are less than fair or ideal. This is no trivial 
undertaking, and to some extent it is the work of a lifetime. Luckily our minds, or an 
important part of them, were built to help us do just this. 
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Witt’s position has helped us situate empirical work on norms with respect to recent 
debates over individualist and structuralist approaches to bias, oppression, and injustice. 
While we embrace much of it, we reject the relegation of psychology. It can be easy to 
identify an individualist approach with one that is sensitive to and guided by details of 
empirical psychological research and a structural approach with one that is indifferent to, if 
not outright dismissive of, such details. We maintain that this is a mistake. But even on this 
front we will end with an olive branch. For there is a sense in which we agree with the spirit 
of Witt’s point, that an overly individualist perspective can be distorting. One of many 
distortions it leads to is a pinching of the imagination, insidiously constricting “psychology” 
to what can be made sense of through the lens of individual choice and personal decision. We 
hold that this narrowing of psychology should be rejected as well and hope to have 
contributed to a corrective trend. 
 
While this paper was developing, we had trouble deciding if we were rejecting the 
apparent divide between individualism and structuralism as just one more untenable dualism, 
or trying to transform it from a dichotomy into a trichotomy by offering a third way, or 
walking between the horns of a dilemma, or doing something else. We have settled on this: 
individualism and structuralism are useful heuristics, names for very general ways a theorist 
can first orient herself and form an initial perspective on these kinds of issues. She will 
choose one depending on her interests, aims, and primary explanatory targets. While 
obviously helpful, this pair of heuristics also feeds a vision of sharp boundaries, a clean 
separation between individuals and structures. It also encourages a picture on which there is 
a gap between concepts and theories that take individuals as their starting point and those 
that take structures as primary. However, we hold that sustained and serious application of 
either approach will inevitably (tacitly or otherwise) make assumptions about and help itself 
to resources typically regarded as belonging to the other.49 And so what are needed are more 
and better examples of ways to mind the gap: to continue integrating psychological 
research, conceived of capaciously rather than narrowly, with ideas about structures and 
institutions, and to continue softening the boundaries between the two. We offer our 
discussion in this spirit, and hope to have shown that norms, with their double life in the 
dedicated, sub-personal psychological machinery of individual minds, on the one hand, and 
in the connective tissue of soft social structures, on the other, serve as an ideal illustrating 
case. 
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